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Abstract
Background: Over the past three decades, a limited range of market like mechanisms have been introduced into
the hierarchically structured English National Health Service (‘NHS’), which is a nationally tax funded, budget limited
healthcare system, with access to care for all, producing structures known as a quasi market. Recently, the Health
and Social Care Act 2012 (‘HSCA’) has been enacted, introducing further market elements. The paper examines the
theory and effects of these market mechanisms.
Methods: Using neo-classical economics as a primary theoretical framework, as well as new institutional economics
and socio-legal theory, the paper first examines the fundamental elements of markets, comparing these with the
operation of authority and resource allocation employed in hierarchical structures. Second, the paper examines the
application of market concepts to the delivery of healthcare, drawing out the problems which economic and socio-
legal theories predict are likely to be encountered. Third, the paper discusses the research evidence concerning the
operation of the quasi market in the English NHS. This evidence is provided by research conducted in the UK which
uses economic and socio-legal logic to investigate the operation of the economic aspects of the NHS quasi market.
Fourth, the paper provides an analysis of the salient elements of the quasi market regime amended by the HSCA 2012.
Results: It is not possible to construct a market conforming to classical economic principles in respect of
healthcare. Moreover, it is not desirable to do so, as goals which markets cannot deliver (such as fairness of access)
are crucial in England. Most of the evidence shows that the quasi market mechanisms used in the English NHS do
not appear to be effective either. This finding should be seen in the light of the fact that the operation of these
mechanisms has been significantly affected by the national political (i.e. continuingly hierarchical) and budgetary
context in which they are operating.
Conclusion: The organisational structures of a hierarchy are more appropriate for the delivery of healthcare in the
English NHS.
Introduction
Although England in the 20th and 21st century is gener-
ally a market based, capitalist society, as far as the pro-
duction of most goods and services is concerned, it is
notable that the funding and delivery of many public ser-
vices has not been left entirely to markets. Nevertheless,
in the last few decades, there has been a notable increase
in the use of market mechanisms in public services
including healthcare [1]. This paper will examine the
theory, possible difficulties and actual effects of introdu-
cing market like mechanisms into the hierarchically
structured English National Health Service (NHS), bear-
ing in mind that the NHS is a nationally tax funded, bud-
get limited system, with access to care for all. I will argue
that there are serious limits to the efficacy of using eco-
nomic market principles in the delivery of healthcare.
(The paper does not seek to provide a historical, political
or political economy analysis of why markets have
become more prevalent in English public services. It pro-
vides a technical analysis based on economic theory and
evidence.) The paper consists of a first section examiningCorrespondence: pauline.allen@lshtm.ac.uk
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the fundamental elements of markets, comparing them
with the operation of the mechanisms of authority and
resource allocation employed in hierarchical structures to
deliver public services. The second section discusses the
application of market concepts to the delivery of a com-
plex product such as healthcare, and draws out the pro-
blems which economic and socio-legal theories predict
are likely to be encountered when attempting to use mar-
kets in healthcare, and discuss the theoretical reasons for
the use of hierarchies to deliver public services instead.
The third section then discusses the evidence concerning
the actual operation of market elements in the NHS. The
fourth section discusses the future operation of market
instruments under the regime set out in the Health and
Social Care Act 2012, and the conclusion will reiterate
the case for hierarchical governance of NHS services in
England.
Theory
Economic theory of markets
Basic economic theory of the perfect market
In order to understand the logic behind introducing
market mechanisms into public services, it is necessary
to understand how perfect markets are meant to work,
and what their advantages over other forms of institu-
tional structure are thought to be. A brief and simplified
explanation of the key concepts of markets follows. The
core notion is that there are willing and rational buyers
of goods or services (demand) and willing and rational
providers of goods or services (supply). In order for a
market to operate efficiently, there need to be sufficient
numbers of each for competition to occur [2]. Economic
theory states that, in these circumstances, the price at
which goods/services are purchased will be the most
efficient one (the equilibrium). In pure markets, demand
is expressed by the individuals who receive the goods/
services making choices themselves and paying their
own money. It is assumed that consumers are able to
find and process sufficient information about the goods/
services to make rational choices. These conditions
ensure that each person’s individual utility is maximised,
as they each are the best judge of what will achieve this.
Thus, the market has produced value for money by allo-
cating resources to the best use. The mechanism by
which demand and supply is brought together is a con-
tract, under which the parties are free to agree whatever
terms they wish, and which will be enforced by the legal
system. In perfect markets, not only is efficiency
achieved, but so is accountability, as each consumer has
made her own decision based on adequate information,
and the terms of the agreement between the consumer
and supplier can be enforced against the supplier using
contract law.
Lack of perfect market leads to need for regulation
It is recognised that markets for many (if not most)
goods and services do not accord with these principles,
so adjustments are made. It is often the case that a mar-
ket will not be perfectly competitive, due to distortions
on the supply side (including natural monopolies caused
by the nature of the product) and/or asymmetries of
information between supply and demand, and regulation
will be required in order to ensure that suppliers do not
use their market power to increase prices above the effi-
cient level, or to provide low quality products [3]. In
theory, if regulation is performed appropriately, most of
the advantages of the market can be attained.
Markets not concerned with equity
It should be noted that theories of markets do not clas-
sically concern themselves with problems in the fairness
of the distribution of goods and services [4]. Consumers
simply use the resources they have available to purchase
what they most desire, thereby maximising their indivi-
dual utilities. The notion of needing or deserving ser-
vices which cannot be purchased is not included.
Limitations to economic theory of markets
Of course, this simple economic theory of markets has
been subject to many criticisms over the years (e.g.
[5,6]). The most important ones are a) that it is wrong
to assume that human motivation is primarily self-inter-
ested [5]; and b) that this type of approach ignores the
fact that economic transactions are embedded in social
relationships [7-9]. This paper will not deal with these
important points – rather, it seeks to use an economic
framework to analyse and question the effectiveness of
markets for healthcare.
Theory of hierarchies
In contrast to markets, where power is distributed among
all participants, in a hierarchy there is a single person or
group at the top with the most power and authority, and
each lower level represents a lesser authority. Instead of
competition between freely operating providers, decisions
about supply are made inside the hierarchy using author-
ity. Consumers do not make direct consumption deci-
sions either: the hierarchy allocates goods and services to
them. Many public services are organised according to
these basic principles. Instead of direct payment for ser-
vices, governments collect taxes and use these resources
to produce services and allocate them to consumers. One
of the reasons for this is that notions of rights and need
are thought to be important determinants of allocation of
public services [10], and hierarchies are needed to make
decisions on behalf of collectivities of people, taking
account of these concepts.
Classic economic theory sees hierarchical structures as
relatively inefficient compared to markets. This is
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because centralised authority is employed to make deci-
sions about the use of resources, rather than the ‘invisible
hand’ [11] of the market, under which many individual
decisions are aggregated to form an equilibrium. The for-
mer may reduce efficiency in production of goods/ser-
vices. Furthermore, Williamson [12] notes that the lack
of strong incentives in hierarchies, compared to contrac-
tual relationships in markets, is likely to reduce the effi-
ciency of command and control structures.
In addition to possible reductions in efficiency, hierar-
chies introduce additional questions about accountability
to consumers of services which do not occur in pure mar-
kets. It is primarily decisions on the demand side which
become more complex as decisions are not made by each
consumer, but by someone else in the hierarchy on their
behalf. In these circumstances, the notion of holding
someone to account for those decisions becomes mean-
ingful. A useful definition of accountability is ‘a relation-
ship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has
an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct,
the forum can pose questions and pass judgement and the
actor may face consequences’ [13]. There are various ways
in which these decision makers can be held to account
including (depending on the circumstances) use of legal
sanctions, locally agreed contracts and public elections. All
of these have their problems [14-16]. It should be noted
that there are intermediate forms of organisation between
markets and hierarchies, which are often labelled ‘net-
works’ (e.g. [17]). For the sake of clarity, discussion of
these is not included in this paper, whose focus is a cri-
tique of the use of markets in the NHS, not a general sur-
vey of possible organisational forms for the delivery of
healthcare. Hierarchies have been presented here as the
alternative to markets as they are theoretically the most
useful contrast to markets; and also the prominent existing
(and historic) organisational logic in the NHS.
Limits of markets in healthcare and other public services
Use of hierarchies in public services
Despite the fact that simple economic theory indicates
that markets will be more efficient than forms of hierar-
chy and accountability will not be so complex, we see
that many public services have been delivered through
institutional structures which more closely resemble hier-
archies than markets. This is because the basic principles
of market theory do not apply to many public services,
and particularly not to healthcare [4].
A very brief explanation of why this is the case fol-
lows. Firstly, concerns about need and entitlement
immediately intrude – in England, we take the view that
people are entitled to healthcare, even if they cannot
afford to buy it when they need it. As the market for
insurance against healthcare expenses does not work
properly [4], in England we choose to fund healthcare
using compulsory taxes. This means that consumers are
not using their own resources to make decisions about
healthcare use. Nor are they usually making choices
about their provider, as this is made on their behalf by
government officials acting as agents. Secondly, the
complex nature of healthcare means that patients find it
very difficult to obtain and digest sufficient information
to make their own decisions about their consumption –
professional expertise and advice is the most important
aspect of healthcare [18]. There are significant asymme-
tries of information between providers of care and
patients. (And, indeed between agents acting on behalf
of patients.) This means that the market condition of
perfect information does not apply. Thirdly, due to the
complexity of healthcare, it has to be regulated to
ensure quality is maintained. This means that there will
not be total freedom of supply. Moreover, there are also
large costs associated with establishing and running hos-
pitals, there may not be sufficient suppliers to ensure
competition occurs [4]. Lack of full competition,
together with the other missing factors, will affect the
capacity of a market for healthcare to be efficient in the
sense of maximising individual utilities.
Theory of the quasi market for healthcare
Due to these factors, the form of market for healthcare
introduced into the hierarchical system in England was
in fact a quasi-market [19]. This sought to combine the
advantages of competition between suppliers with the
safety of retaining public funding to protect fairness in
access to care [1]. An internal market for community,
secondary and tertiary health care was introduced by
means of a split between the purchasers of care (health
authorities, which were local outposts of the NHS state
hierarchy, and GP fundholders, who were some general
practice physicians who chose to hold a budget of NHS
money to spend on certain aspects of NHS care for
their patients) and its providers. The providers of health
care were constituted into relatively autonomous ‘self
governing NHS Trusts’ (still publicly owned), who were
supposed to compete with each other, thereby enhan-
cing technical efficiency (that is ensuring the greatest
output for the least resources used, i.e. ‘value for
money’) [19]. Proponents (such as Enthoven, [20]) con-
tended that technical efficiency was more likely to be
achieved in a situation of competition between provi-
ders, which could make their own decisions about
modes of delivery of care, than in a structure (such as a
hierarchy) which effectively contained monopoly provi-
ders. Decisions about consumption of community, sec-
ondary and tertiary health care were made by agents in
the state hierarchy on behalf of patients [21]. (There
have since been changes in this aspect of the quasi mar-
ket to increase individual patient choice [22]. These will
be discussed below.) The system of annual budget
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allocations was to be replaced with one based on nego-
tiated contracts between purchasers and providers [19].
A Department of Health (i.e. the national Ministry of
Health in England) diagram of the quasi market under
the New Labour government demonstrates how policy
makers envisaged that the different economic building
blocks would work together to improve efficiency and
quality of care. See Figure 1. The system attempted to
bring together the necessary quasi-market elements I
have discussed above in a manner which sharpened the
market incentives compared to the Conservatives’ quasi
market of the 1990s. The emphasis on quasi-markets as
a motor for improvement is encapsulated in ‘four inter-
related pillars of reform’ which ‘are designed to embed
incentives for continuous and self sustaining improve-
ment’ and produce ‘better quality, better patient experi-
ence, better value for money and reduced inequality’
[23]. These are: ‘(i) Demand side reform - more choice
and a stronger voice for patients; (ii) Transactional
reform - money following patients, rewarding the best
and most efficient providers, giving others the incentive
to improve; (iii) System management and regulation - a
framework of system management, regulation and deci-
sion making which guarantees safety and quality, fair-
ness and equity; and (iv) Supply side reform – more
diverse providers, with more freedom to innovate and
improve services.’ [23].
Theoretical limits to the quasi market: related economic
and socio legal approaches
While a quasi market has been seen by some as the best
solution to providing efficient and high quality health-
care [1,20], aspects of economic and legal theory indi-
cate that serious problems could be encountered in
moving from the pre-existing hierarchy to such a
system.
The first issue is that of demand side and agency. As
patients are not able to make their own consumption deci-
sions, the demand side of the quasi market still relies on
parts of the state (and GPs) making decisions for them. In
order for the market to work, these agents would have to
make decisions only taking into account patients’ goals,
Agency theory [24] indicates that it will be very difficult to
align their goals to those of patients. Propper [21] explains
that the fact that health care is publicly funded means that
Figure 1 The four interrelated pillars of reform.
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the government needs to monitor its agents. But monitor-
ing is problematic: in the absence of perfect information,
the principal will not be able to tell whether the agent has
failed to perform or, if there is a failure to produce the
required services, whether the agent was responsible for
that failure (by shirking, for example) or whether it is due
to unforeseen circumstances [25]. Propper [21] also points
out that it is clear that the government will not be able to
monitor all aspects of output and that partial monitoring
is likely to reduce the incentives on agents to undertake
other dimensions of performance which are not being
monitored. The introduction of patient choice is partly
aimed at dealing with this problem. But it cannot obviate
it, as the nature of healthcare means that patients are not
able to act as fully informed, rational consumers.
The second issue concerns the supply side. The nature
of healthcare means that there is unlikely to be a large
degree of competition, especially in respect of specialist
hospitals, and in sparsely populated areas [4]. These two
issues are likely to decrease the possibility of overall effi-
ciency being improved by using a quasi market.
The third issue concerns the central mechanisms of
the quasi market: pricing and contracting for care. As it
is impossible to monitor all aspects of healthcare perfor-
mance, economic theory predicts that competition invol-
ving negotiated prices would reduce quality [26], as
providers can skimp on unobserved aspects in order to
lower their costs [25]. In order to avoid this problem,
fixed prices were introduced gradually into the NHS
quasi-market from 2003/4, so that competition should
be based on quality alone [27]. However, this does not
obviate the problem that not all quality can be observed,
and skimping on quality and intensity of treatment may
occur [28]. Moreover, the price has to be fixed some-
how, and this process may cause other difficulties. If the
price is too low, although providers may be encouraged
to become more efficient, they still may be able to
skimp on quality. If the price is too high, there is no
incentive for providers to become more efficient [29].
The problem is that it is not possible to monitor all
aspects of health care affects more than price setting, in
fact. It has the potential to undermine the effective use
of contracts in healthcare markets, both in terms of
increasing efficiency and in achieving accountability.
The literature on the economics of contracting indicates
that the transactions cost of contracting for healthcare
will be significant. If these are taken into account, the
supposed increased efficiency produced by competition
in a market system is made more questionable. When
contracting for a complex service, such as healthcare, a
range of contractual difficulties are likely to occur.
Briefly, these are difficulties in specifying what is
required, and problems in monitoring caused by asym-
metry of information and the complexity of services and
also the ever present possibility of opportunism [12].
Transactions costs result from imperfect information,
either about the other party involved in the exchange
(asymmetric information) or about the future (uncer-
tainty). Imperfect information means that it is costly to
enter into contracts for the exchange of rights, since the
parties will have to incur the costs of searching for a
suitable trading partner and then negotiate and write
contracts (ex ante transactions costs). It also makes it
costly to monitor, enforce and renegotiate contracts (ex
post transactions costs). Both types of transactions cost
may be high, but when there is a high level of uncer-
tainty about relevant events there may be a trade-off
between the two: the costs of making contracts may be
reduced by not attempting fully to specify contingencies,
leaving a contract incomplete and necessitating renego-
tiation (leading to ex post transactions costs) to accom-
modate events left out of the contract. This means that
such contracts will not be ‘complete’ [12].
Complementing the economic approach, an influential
strand of socio-legal contract theory focuses on the way in
which transactions are underpinned by a combination of
discrete norms, such as consent and choice, that are neces-
sary for planning and presentation (i.e. the deliberate
attempt, through planning, to bring the future into the
present), together with relational norms such as flexibility
and reciprocity that are essential to support trust and
cooperation [30,31]. Contractual exchanges are said to be
‘relational’ to the extent that they reflect an appropriate
balance between discrete and relational norms, thereby
creating the conditions for the attainment of the joint wel-
fare-maximising benefits associated with successful con-
tractual relationships in business practice. (Successful
contractual relationships in business practice allow both
parties to achieve the goals they regard as most important.
These might include, from the seller’s point of view, selling
goods at a fair price which allows a profit to be made; and,
from the buyer’s point of view, obtaining goods of accepta-
ble quality at a fair price.) The combination of contract
norms varies according to the nature of the transaction,
with the discrete norms being particularly prominent in
short-term or spot exchanges, while relational norms are
more evident in continuing or long-term contractual rela-
tionships. This combined economic/socio-legal theoretical
perspective predicts that the quality of relationality, while
a necessary precondition of the success of all contractual
relations, may be difficult to achieve in market exchanges
where the characteristics engendering high transactions
costs pertain [32]. This means that, despite the views of
some commentators [33], trust and cooperation will not
be able to make up for deficiencies in the contract in
respect of specification and monitoring.
Finally, the very difficulties which lead to high transac-
tions costs in healthcare contracting also indicate that it
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will be difficult to use these contracts to achieve full
accountability from providers of care, as it will not be
possible to monitor all aspects of performance. This
means that the simple model of markets as a method to
improve accountability is flawed, as it does not take
account of the difficulties in contracting.
Theoretical advantages of hierarchies for healthcare
delivery
The foregoing considerations indicate that there may be
some advantages in retaining hierarchies as the institu-
tional structure for organising healthcare. For example,
transactions costs theory indicates that hierarchies may
be more efficient in the provision of healthcare. The
stronger incentives of markets may be detrimental to
efficiency and quality of care where those incentives
cannot be effectively harnessed for the public good.
Once the incentives of markets are introduced, one can
expect stakeholders to avail themselves of the opportu-
nities they present, and the stronger the incentives, the
more likely they are to change behaviour. For example,
if for profit providers of care enter the market, these
firms have stronger incentives to skimp on quality to
increase their surpluses, as these can be distributed as
profit. In addition to the economic reasons, as men-
tioned earlier, one very important reason why govern-
mental hierarchies are often preferred for the delivery of
public services is that considerations of fairness of
access and additional social value (in the form of extern-
alities) are equally important to policy makers as effi-
ciency [34]. These functions are better handled by the
exercise of authority in command and control structures
than in the decentralised decision making of individuals
in markets.
Evidence on the operation of the quasi-market in the
English NHS
In this section, I will provide a brief overview of the evi-
dence concerning the operation of the NHS quasi-mar-
ket, using the theoretically based topics about markets in
healthcare outlined above to structure the analysis.
(Fuller accounts of the effects of the quasi market policies
of the two successive governments of the last twenty five
years (ie. the Conservatives and New Labour) respectively
can be found in [35] and [36].) The evidence cited here is
derived from research conducted by researchers based in
the UK which uses economic and socio-legal logic to
investigate the operation of the economic aspects of the
NHS internal market using its own theoretical basis. It
does not seek to include wider literature which criticises
the logic of markets generally, nor in the NHS specifically
e.g.[37]. Moreover, space constraints do not allow me to
include the extensive discussions of the methodological
approaches used in recent studies of quality and competi-
tion (e.g.[38] and [39]).
Demand side of the quasi-market
Starting with the demand side, research has indeed
demonstrated that agents acting on behalf of patients
have not been effective [21,35,40-42]. These agents
hardly used their market power to make changes. More-
over, the more recent introduction of a policy allowing
a degree of individual patient choice of provider has not
been widely taken up in practice, and does not seem to
have had an appreciable effect on providers [43,44]. One
reason for this is likely to be that patients are not will-
ing or able to obtain and process the necessary informa-
tion, as theory predicts. An important aspect of the
demand side relates to the operation of the quasi market
as a whole. This is the role of state organisations which
commission care on behalf of patients (latterly these
were called primary care trusts, PCTs) in relation to
market entry by non NHS owned providers. It appears
that the attitudes of PCTs have varied considerably, and
that their behaviour can make the difference between
such providers gaining a foothold in the NHS or failing
to do so [45].
Supply side of the quasi-market
Evidence about the supply side in English quasi markets
shows that there has not been a large amount of competi-
tion between suppliers [46] and [47]. As economic theory
predicts, where competition occurred under negotiated
prices, quality of care reduced [46]. On the other hand,
there is some emerging evidence that competition under
fixed prices may have increased quality of care [47]; and
[48], as economic theory predicts.
The other aspect of the supply side which is thought
important in economic theory is the degree to which
organisations providing care are free to make their own
decisions, as opposed to being controlled by, for example,
a government hierarchy. This freedom is thought to be
important in achieving more efficient and higher quality
care, as those actually running the organisations have
better information about how to organise delivery to
respond to patient need and demand [49]. Evidence from
research about more autonomous NHS (i.e. state owned)
hospitals introduced by New Labour (Foundation Trusts,
FTs) does not bear this out because those hospitals
selected to become FTs were already performing better
than their comparators –thus it cannot be inferred that
FT status was the cause of better performance [50]. The
research evidence also indicates that FT autonomy has
been severely circumscribed, and the national NHS hier-
archy still has a strong influence on FT decision making
[51] . Moreover, there is no evidence to suggest that
independent providers (whether for profit or otherwise)
are performing better (or indeed, worse) than NHS
owned organisations. It should be noted, however, that
very little evidence is actually available to date, and none
in respect of efficiency [50].
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Economic regulation of the quasi-market
Economic theory also predicts that regulation will be a
key instrument in improving the workings of the NHS
quasi market being designed to encourage competition
and deter monopolies [4]. There does not appear, how-
ever, to be any research evidence concerning the eco-
nomic regulation of the NHS quasi-market [52]. The
current competition regulator is the Cooperation and
Competition Panel (CCP), which is a government body
established at arm’s length from the Department of
Health. The CCP’s mandate demonstrates that it has a
series of concerns to take into account simultaneously,
not all of which deal with promotion of competition. It
has to follow the Principles and Rules of Co-operation
and Competition set out by government [53]. These
state that both co-operation and competition are desir-
able . Furthermore, its actual decisions demonstrate that
considerations other than promotion of competition
have been taken into account [54].
Pricing and contracting in the quasi-market
Turning to the key mechanisms of the NHS quasi
market – pricing and contracting – we find that avail-
able evidence bears out the issues raised by theory in
some respects, but not in others. Research about the use
of the national tariff (PbR) indicates that there is no evi-
dence to support theoretically based concerns about it
incentivising skimping on quality [28]. Difficulties in set-
ting the correct prices have been encountered (as
expected) and it is not clear what effect the tariff has
had on hospital efficiency [28]. It should also be noted
that the national tariff has not in fact been used on all
occasions when it has been mandated for use. The NHS
hierarchy has stepped in to blunt the effects of this pay-
ment by activity system, as commissioners did not have
sufficient funds [32,55,56].
As far as contracting is concerned, the evidence has
confirmed the difficulties raised by transactions costs and
socio-legal theory. It has not been possible to make com-
plete contracts for healthcare, specifying and monitoring
quality has proved problematic, and thus, contracts have
not been able to achieve full accountability of providers
[32,42,57,58]. Although a high degree of relationality has
often been achieved, the development of a measure of
trust and cooperation in some contractual relationships
has not been able to make up for lack of completeness.
The introduction of a national standard contract in 2007
with the aims of obviating duplicated effort on the part of
commissioners, and of improving the detail of specifica-
tion and monitoring has not significantly improved
matters [32].
Continuing use of hierarchy in the quasi-market
In addition to considering evidence about the operation of
the economic building blocks of the NHS quasi market,
it is necessary to bear in mind the degree to which
command and control hierarchical measures continue to
operate concurrently [20,35,36]. Some of these hierarchical
measures have been mentioned in the discussion of the
evidence above. One of the reasons why these measures
continue, despite an increasingly enthusiastic espousal of
market principles by the New Labour government during
its term of office from 1997 to 2010 [59], is that policy
makers have a range of goals for the NHS, not all of which
can be met by using market mechanisms. These additional
goals include promoting continuity of care for patients
(which requires cooperation between providers – hence
the need for the CCP to include principles on cooperation,
as well as competition); meeting national standards for
quality; and keeping the whole NHS within nationally set
financial limits. As Jessop [60] points out, the Third Way
State undertakes ‘meta-governance’ by a ‘judicious mixing
of market, hierarchies and networks’. In New Labour’s
NHS, these hierarchical policies included most notably the
continuing use of national targets for issues such as redu-
cing hospital acquired infections and reducing inpatient
waiting times [61]. Introduction of a standard form of con-
tract to be used in the market regime somewhat under-
mined the notion of a market as involving the devolution
of power. Finally, each year an operating framework was
issued to the NHS by the Department of Health setting
out annual priorities for the whole system to follow (e.g.
[61]). Not only did these blunt the efficacy of financial
incentives, but they also overrode demand side and provi-
der autonomy to some extent [51].
Quasi-market policies of the Coalition government
This paper has shown how economic market principles
are difficult to apply to healthcare, and some of the con-
sequent challenges which the NHS has faced in operating
a quasi-market for the last two decades. The Coalition
government has made further policy changes to the NHS
in the Health and Social Care Act 2012 (HSCA), which is
a major piece of national legislation dealing with the
structure of the NHS in England. These mainly continue
in the direction that the New Labour government set in
its later reforms [62]. In addition to the changes on the
demand side (which are not germane to the economic
argument, as patients will continue to have a mixture of
agents acting on their behalf and some degree of indivi-
dual choice), there has been a serious attempt to intro-
duce full economic regulation. Monitor will take over as
economic regulator, and there will be a statutory obliga-
tion on it to promote competition (HSCA, s 62 (3)), and
it will be obliged to carry out anti competitive regulatory
functions in conjunction with the Office of Fair Trading
under the Competition Act 1998 (HSCA s 72). (Monitor
is a government body originally established at arm’s
length to the Department of Health to authorise and reg-
ulate the activities of FTs.) Nevertheless, it should be
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noted that the enacted version of the HSCA also requires
Monitor to take into account a wide range of other goals,
including integrating services (s 62 (4)); ensuring fair
access to care; improving the quality of care; and obtain-
ing value for money (HSCA s66). The force of economic
regulation to promote competition has been significantly
blunted by the additional provisions in the HSCA (and
thus pure economic market principles have been com-
promised). The detailed regulatory and licensing provi-
sions of the HCSA are also designed to promote the
entry of independent providers of care into the NHS
quasi market by ensuring there is ‘level playing field’ for
these organisations to compete against NHS owned pro-
viders (which, for the avoidance of doubt, still include
FTs). This encouragement of diversity of provision is part
of the attempt to increase competition among providers,
which is a key economic mechanism in markets.
The economic goal of increasing autonomy for provi-
ders of care has been promoted in several ways. The
Coalition policy is that all NHS trusts should become
FTs by 2014 [63], which is coupled with statements that
there will be a significant reduction in command and
control activity from the centre (for example, the use of
targets is to be abolished [64] – although the new out-
comes framework [65] seems remarkably similar to a
target in practice). FTs will also be able to increase the
amount of income they earn from private patients above
the existing cap (the amount prior to elevation to FT
status) set in previous legislation (HCSA s 165). FTs will
now be able to earn anything up to half of their income
from private sources, provided this does not interfere
with the discharge of their primary functions to treat
NHS funded patients (HCSA s 164). In the context of
increasing financial stringency in the NHS budget, it
will be important to investigate the extent to which this
provision allows privately funded care to substitute for
care previously funded by the NHS. If it does, some of
the demand side of the healthcare market will have
become closer to classical economic market principles,
where consumers make and fund their own consump-
tion decisions. Other goals, particularly concerning fair-
ness of access to care, may well be compromised,
however.
In sum, the HSCA contains attempts to increase the
force of economic market mechanisms in the NHS quasi
market, mainly in respect of provider regulation and
autonomy, but these efforts have been attenuated by the
provisions aimed at ensuring that other important goals
of the NHS are still taken into account.
Conclusion
Having surveyed the theory of markets, the nature of
healthcare and the available evidence concerning the
English quasi-market in the NHS, two points are evident.
It is not possible to construct a market conforming to
classical economic principles in respect of healthcare.
Moreover, it is not desirable to do so, as goals (such as
fairness of access to care) are also crucial, and these are
not goals which markets can deliver.
I now turn to the advantages of a using the organisa-
tional structures of a hierarchy for the delivery of
healthcare in the English NHS. Firstly, in the English
political context, where central government will inevita-
bly be held politically responsible for health services, the
hierarchical structure may give the government the best
opportunity to exercise control over the NHS. Unlike
the quasi-market (where, in principle, organisational
separation and contracting precluded the use of direct
sanctions against provider Trust managers) in a true
hierarchy, sanctions are available to higher echelons to
use against all lower levels. This can improve account-
ability. Secondly, a hierarchy allows strategic planning
and allocatively efficient decisions to take place at the
appropriate level of aggregation. Thirdly, institutional
economic analysis indicates that hierarchical governance
structures may well be most efficient, in terms of reduc-
tion of transactions costs, for complex services. Fourthly,
the authority relationships contained in a hierarchy can
be used to foster important normative influences, such
as public service ethics, while any confusion in public
servants’ minds about the role of competition and self
interest which could be caused by the introduction of
market mechanisms [66] will be absent.
Whatever governance structures are used, there will
always be problems associated with systems of planning
and delivering public services. It is arguable that in the
context of British political culture, a public hierarchy is
the least bad solution. As Jackson [67] points out:
‘Given that many activities, which were organised
through the public sector, were located there because
of the failure of markets to allocate them effectively
and given our understanding of what markets cannot
do, then it is a bit strange to believe that the pro-
blems of bureaucracy could be solved by taking these
services out of the traditional bureaucracy and con-
fronting them with greater amounts of competition
and managerial control.’ (p 13)
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